South Carolina Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 1 Survey of South Carolina Law: April
1961--March 1962

Article 20

1963

Torts
Henry Summerall Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Summerall, Henry Jr. (1963) "Torts," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 15 : Iss. 1 , Article 20.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/20

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Summerall: Torts

TORTS
HENRY SUMMERALL, JR.*
As is often the case, the Torts cases covered by this Survey
probably have the most interesting facts of any cases but
establish the fewest novel principles of law. However, during
the period covered by this Survey, a case of major importance
in the field of labor relations involving the Right-to-Work
Law was decided; several cases which established general principles were specifically applied for the first time to particular
factual situations, such as in the cases of kicking domestic
animals, maintaining a junked car yard, and failing to maintain a shopping center's sidewalks properly; and the standard
crop of negligence, fraud and other torts cases were decided.
Malicious Prosecution
This year's case with the most interesting facts, Margolis
v. Telech,' illustrates the dangers inherent in using criminal
process to enforce a supposed civil liability. In the events
giving rise to this action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff, who was the defendant's sister-in-law, had come from
Elmira, New York, to Beaufort, South Carolina, to nurse her
sister who was dying with cancer, living in the house trailer
with her sister and brother-in-law. Shortly after his wife's
death, the defendant missed and could not find her diamond
ring. The plaintiff having moved from the trailer in the
meantime, the defendant accused the plaintiff of stealing the
ring and swore out a warrant for her arrest on the ground
of grand larceny. The plaintiff's version, which the defendant
knew at the time he took out the warrant, was that before
she died her sister had given her the ring and a black coat
and had loaned her a fur coat and blue suit. The plaintiff
was arrested as she left the cemetery after the funeral. The
grand jury later returned a no bill on the indictment, and
the plaintiff instituted this action for malicious prosecution.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict for actual and
punitive damages. The Court, viewing the evidence most
*Henderson, Salley & Cushman, Aiken, South Carolina.
1. 239 S. C. 232, 122 S. E. 2d 417 (1961).
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favorably to the plaintiff, upheld the verdict, stating the
general rule as follows:
It is well settled that, in order to maintain an action for
malicious prosecution, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff
to show that the prosecution was instituted maliciously,
without probable cause, and that it terminated favorably
to plaintiff.

2

The opinion contains a definition of probable cause and
of malice in the sense with which it is used in the law of
torts. The Court very aptly quoted the following from an old
case 3 on the subject of a lack of caution indicating malice:
The term "malice," as applied to torts, does not necessarily mean that which must proceed from a spiteful,
malignant or revengeful disposition, but a conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from an ill-regulated mind not sufficiently cautious before it occasions
an injury to another. 2 Bouv. Die. 98. And, in the same
case, it is said: Malice "is implied where it shows a disregard of the -consequences of the injurious act, without reference to any special injury which he may inflict
on another", and "in doing some illegal act for one's own
gratification or purposes, without regard to the rights
of others or the injury he may inflict on another". 4
Defamation
The one case in the very technical area of defamation illustrates the tendency of the courts to restrict liability for
torts against reputation while expanding liability for torts
causing personal injury.
In Brown v. National Home Inc. Co.,r in the lower court
an insurance agent had recovered a verdict for actual and
punitive damages against an insurance company for its libel
in writing a letter to the State Insurance Commissioner stating
that the agent owed the company $2,312.48 and that no payment on account had been received for nearly two years.
Four grounds of appeal were presented to the Supreme Court,
but the Court based its reversal of the judgment on the one
ground that there was no proof of damages legally sufficient
to support the verdict.
2. 239 S. C. 232 at 237, 122 S. E. 2d 417 at 419 (1961).
3. Hogg v. Pickney, 16 S. C. 387 (1882).
4. 232 S. C. 232 at 238, 122 S. E. 2d 417 at 420 (1961).

5. 239 S. C. 488, 123 S. E. 2d 850 (1962).
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The opinion necessitated a discussion of the distinctions
between a libel per se, which is actionable on its face and
a libel per quod which is actionable only by reason of the
peculiar situation or occasion upon which the words were
written. The Court handled this discussion and definition
with precision and clarity. The Court then concluded that the
publication was not libelous per se, and that proof of damages
was therefore required to support the action.
The Court found no evidence of any legally sufficient
damage resulting from the publication since neither impairment of the plaintiff's credit nor impairment of his relationship with the Insurance Commissioner's office had been
proven. There was evidence, however, that he had been
embarrassed and humiliated. In line with the general authorities,0 the Court held that such mental suffering by itself,
absent a showing of other legally sufficient special damages,
does not constitute an element of damage and will not by itself support a recovery based on a libel which is not actionable per se. Two prior cases holding that humiliation is an
element of damage in an action for defamation 7 were distinguished on the grounds that the language there used was
defamatory per se.
On first blush the Court's conclusion that the letter was
not libelous per se seems arguable, on the grounds that to
charge a business man, an insurance agent, falsely with failing to pay his debt overdue for nearly two years would necessarily affect his business reputation and thus amount to a
defamation per se and thus be actionable without proof of
special damage, within the exception for words tending to
injure one in his trade, business or profession. However,
the Court's conclusion is entirely in accord with the South
Carolina cases involving an imputation of bad credit on the
part of businesmen which apply a very restrictive rule. Apparently, under the South Carolina rule it is not defamatory
per se to charge a businessman falsely with failure to pay a
debt unless the words are specifically spoken against him in
his business capacity, as distinguished from his individual
6. 33 AM. JuR., Libel and Slander § 205 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS p. 594
(2d ed. 1955); HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.30 n. 14 p. 470 (1956); 90

A.L.R. 1200.
7. McClain v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 150 S. C. 459,148 S. E. 478 (1929);
Smith v. Smith, 194 S. C. 247, 9 S. E. 2d 584 (1940).
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capacity.8 The cases can be rationalized on the basis that it
does not injure a businessman as such to accuse him falsely
of owing one debt,9 but it does so injure him to say falsely
that he is "broke" and cannot pay more than 500 on the
dollar 0 or that he has sold out and left the state without
making any provision for paying his debts." The distinction
seems to be a very reasonable one: there is a considerable
difference in charging that a businessman has not paid one
particular debt and in charging that he is bankrupt.
In covering this new territory in the area of defamation,
the Court has followed the direction pointed to by our own
reliable and authoritative guides.
Fraud and Deceit
Three cases for fraud and deceit were decided by the Court
this year, two insurance cases and one arising from the
sale of a used car.
In the automobile case' 2 the defendant's salesman had
represented a 1958 Plymouth, then one year old, as having
about 16,000 miles on it. After the plaintiff had bought it
and driven it 3,000 miles it began to give trouble, the engine
being worn out and requiring new connecting rods and a
new crank shaft. The plaintiff, then more than curious,
traced the vehicle through the Highway Department's records, and discovered that a traveling salesman had formerly owned the car and driven it over 55,000 miles. In the
ensuing tort suit for fraud and deceit the defendant urged
as a defense the express 30 days or 1,000 miles written warranty and the printed form which expressly negated any
representation as to the correctness of speedometer mileage.
The Court dismissed this contention summarily: since the
action was grounded on fraud and deceit and not upon breach
8. See cases in 13 WEST'S SOUTH CAROLINA DIGEST, Libel & Slander,
key number 9 (7), and particularly Galloway v. Cox, 172 S. C. 101, 172
S. E. 761 (1934) wherein the defendant landlord said that his tenant, the
plaintiff who operated a woodyard and owed rent, was dishonest. The
Court here held that to be actionable per se, the words must relate to the
plaintiff's business as the keeper of a woodyard, and that here the words
applied to the plaintiff only in his individual capacity and not in his
business capacity.
9. Brown v. National Home Ins. Co., 239 S. C. 488, 123 S. E. 2d 850
<1962); Galloway v. Cox, 172 S. C. 101, 172 S. E. 761 (1934).
10. Davis v. Ruff, Cheves 17 (S. C. 1839).
11. Bentley ads, Reynolds, 1 McMullan 16 (S. C. 1840).
12. Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S. C. 26, 124 S. E. 2d 585
<1962).
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of warranty, the parol evidence as to the representations was
clearly admissible though contrary to the writing. The defendant's stronger point was his objection that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant knew of the
falsity of the representation. On this point, the real heart
of the case, the Court applied the doctrine that knowledge
of the falsity of a representation is legally inferable from
the making of the representation as of the speaker's personal knowledge with reckless disregard of his lack of information as to its truth. The Court rejected the contention
that the buyer was negligent in failing to inform himself,
for at the time of the sale he had no reason to doubt the
salesman's statements or to know otherwise.
In an insurance case the plaintiff's failure to inform himself of the contents of his insurance policy was held to negate
his cause of action for fraud and deceit in Gordon v. Fideiity
& Casualty Ins. Co. of New York. 13 The complaint alleged
that at the time the medical coverage portion of his policy
was issued to the plaintiff, the defendant's agent assured him
that it made no difference that he was a career soldier and if
injured would be confined to an Army Hospital. On the insurance point the Court held that the policy did not cover such
treatment furnished at Government expense, since the plaintiff had not incurred any expenses. After an extensive review
and summary of the cases, the Court held, the plaintiff barred
form recovering on a theory of fraud and deceit since he had
had the policy for more than eight months, with the opportunity to learn its contents and coverage. The Court stated
the rule thusly:
We have consistently followed the rule that ordinarily
one cannot complain of fraud in the misrepresentation of
the content of a written instrument when the truth
could have been ascertained by reading the instrument,
and one entering into a written contract should read it
and avail himself of every reasonable opportunity to
understand its content and meaning.
One point in the case raises a question: The plaintiff
contended that the silence of the defendant's agent, with
respect to the medical benefits under the policy, constituted
a fraud upon him, thereby invoking the theory of a fraudulent
nondisclosure. To place such a construction upon the facts
13. 238 S. C.438, 120 S. E. 2d 509 (1961).
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does not seem warranted, for this was not a case where the
agent stood silent, but one in which the agent's assertion
amounted to an affirmative statement that the plaintiff would
be covered in a situation which the policy did not cover. In
effect, the agent undertook to construe the policy. Nevertheless, the Court went into the law of fraudulent nondisclosure, stating the three occasions when a duty to disclose
arises. 14 In doing so, the Court relied upon the rule stated
by the old standard authority, Pomeroy.' 5 The Court found
no relation of trust and confidence between the plaintiff and
the defendant's soliciting agent.' 6 However, following Pomeroy, our Court had previously referred to an insurance contract as being intrinsically fiduciary in its essential nature,
thus illustrating the third class of cases in which the duty
to disclose arises.1' If this is so, why is there no duty of
disclosure in the Gordon case under consideration? Probably
the best answer is that once the insurance contract is entered
into, it is intrinsically fiduciary as to matters thereafter
arising so as to impose the duty to disclose upon the insurer,
but in the application or solicitation stage, before the policy
comes into existence, the applicant and the would-be insurer
deal at arm's length, so that there is no duty of disclosure
on the part of the soliciting agent.
Except that the cause of action is misnamed one for fraud
and deceit, Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co.'5 is a sound decision. The defendant had issued to the plaintiff an insurance
policy on the life of her son with face value of $409.00 and
double indemnity of $818.00 should he die by accidental
means. After the son's death, the defendant's agent went to
the plaintiff's house, told her "I have got here with your
14. 238 S. C. 438 at 450, 120 S. E. 2d 509 at 515 (1961): "(1) Where

it arises from a preexisting definite fiduciary relation between the parties;
(2) Where one party expressly reposes a trust and confidence in the
other with reference to the particular transaction in question, or else
from the circumstances of the case, the nature of their dealings, or their
position towards each other, such a trust and confidence in the particular
ease is necessarily implied; (3) Where the very contract or transaction
itself, in its essential nature, is intrinsically fiduciary and necessarily calls
for perfect good faith and full disclosure, without regard to any particular
intention of the parties."
15. 3 POMEROY EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 902, 907 (5th ed. 1941).

I. See- O'Conner v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 217 S. C. 442 at
448, 60 S. E. 2d 884 at 886 (1950) where the Court states: "There was
no relation of trust and confidence between him (plaintiff) and the
soliciting agent."
17. See Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S. C. 427 at 437, 23 S. E.
2d 372 at 376 (1942).
18. 238 S.C. 199, 119 S. E. 2d 685 (1961).
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check at last", placed the check face down on a table with
his hat over it and the release on the table face up, told her,
"Now, this is showing that you are getting your check", and,
after the plaintiff signed a "Claimant's Receipt and Release",
gave her a check for $409.00. The plaintiff recovered a
verdict of $409.00 actual damages and $3,000.00 punitive
damages on the theory that the double indemnity portion of
the policy was effective and that the defendant's agent had
defrauded her in the signing of the release.
The Supreme Court reversed the award of punitive damages
but affirmed the award of actual damages. As to the latter
point, the policy provision excepting accidental death benefits if death resulted from injuries sustained while intoxicated
was construed as requiring proof of a causal connection between the insured's intoxication and his injury or death,
which proof was lacking. On the former point, the Court
found no fraud, there being no false representation on the
agent's part, since his statement ("Now this is showing that
you are getting your check.") was true.
The difficulty with the case is technical: if the cause of
action was one in tort to recover damages for fraud and
deceit, as counsel evidently considered it and as the Court
accordingly designated it, since there was no fraud on the
defendant's part, no damages at all should have been awarded,
neither actual no punitive. I suggest that the cause of action
should really be considered to have been one for breach of
contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. This analysis fits
the facts and the result of the case much better than the tort
fraud and deceit theory, for the result in this case was exactly the same as in many of the so-called "fraudulent breach
of contract" cases: recovery of punitive damages is denied
because no fraud is proven, but recovery of actual damages is
allowed because the contract has been breached. Procuring a
release by fraud is a fraudulent act accompanying the breach
of a contract which will justify recovery of punitive damages
in an action on the contract to recover actual damages for its
breach. 10 One may say that this distinction between the tort
action of fraud and deceit and the quasi-contract, quasi-tort;
action for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act
is far too technical, and smacks too much of the old strict
19. See Summerall, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract in Southl
Carolina,10 S.C.L.Q. 444 at page 468 (1958).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1963

7

19621

SURVEY
OF SOUTH
-CAROLINA
LAW
South Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 15,
Iss. 1 [1963], Art. 20

common law procedure under which the pleader was thrown
out of court for misnaming his cause of action. However,
the distinction is firmly embedded in the law and it should
therefore be observed in the interest of logical and clear
thought and orderly procedure.20 The decision is undoubtedly
sound, but it would likely make for clearer analysis had the
plaintiff's cause of action been characterized as one for
breach of contract accompanied by a fradulent act rather
than as one in tort for fraud and deceit.
Liability for Keeping Domestic Animals
In two cases the Supreme Court had occasion to consider
the novel question of the liability of the owner of an animal
which kicked and injured a third person. Recovery was allowed in one case and denied in the other, illustrating the
truth of the saying that the facts make the law.
In the first of these cases 2 1 in an excellent and thorough

opinion by acting Justice Griffith the Court discussed the
liability of an owner of a kicking horse. The defendant,
familiar with his horse and knowing its dangerous propensity,
summoned his colored neighbor, the plaintiff, to the scene
where he was currying his horse which the plaintiff had never
before seen. While the plaintiff was standing near the horse's
right front shoulder, the horse turned or "flounged" sideways and kicked the 'plaintiff, knocking him down, and then
jumped the lot fence and ran away. The Court affirmed the
award of $7,500.00 actual damages, basing the horse owner's
liability on two conclusions: 1) That the horse was dangerous
or vicious and that he was aware of it; and 2) that he was
negligent in calling the plaintiff to the place of danger without giving any warning. The Court further held that the
plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law since he was located at the horse's side and not at its
heels at the time it kicked him, and that there was no basis
for application of the assumption of risk doctrine to the case.
The opinion contains an excellent statement and discussion
of the law relating to the liability of an animal owner for
injuries it causes to third persons. As the old dog bite
20. Three cases illustrating the difference are: Branham v. Wilson
Motor Co., 188 S. C. 1, 198 S. E. 417 (1938); Smyth v. Fleischmann, 214
S. C. 263, 52 S. E. 2d 199 (1949); and Wright v. Harris, 228 S.C. 144,
89 S. E. 2d 97 (1955).
21. Mungo v. Bennett, 238 S. C. 79, 119 S. E. 2d 522 (1961).
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cas e 2 denied a dog its one bite, this case denies a horse even
a single kick.
In the second of the two cases 23 the Court considered the
liability of the owner of a cow which kicked its milker. There
the plaintiff was a dairy herdsman with fifteen years' experience who had been in the defendant's employ for three
years and who had raised Lula, the cow in question, and
had worked with her for two years. After giving him a
warning kick, Lula hauled off and kicked the plaintiff as he
was trying to attach a milking apparatus to her. The trial
judge ordered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding
the jury's verdict of $4,000.00 actual damages and the Supreme Court affirmed. In this employee versus employer
situation the Court applied the assumption of risk doctrine:
The plaintiff's "injuries resulted from an ordinary risk of
his employment, of which he had knowledge, and which he
had therefore assumed. ' 24 The Court found no basis for applying the doctrine's exception "where, there being basis for
honest difference of opinion as to the manner in which he
might more safely perform his work, the servant surrenders

in reliance upon his master's
his judgment of unsafety
25
judgment.
superior
Right-To-Work Law
In Kimbrell v. Jolog Sportswear, Inc., 2G the plaintiffs, nonunion employees, brought a class action to recover actual and
punitive damages for their employer's tortious withholding
of wages due them, alleging that their employer had paid

wages due them over to the International Ladies Garment
Workers' Union without their consent, and joining both the
employer and the union as defendants. The action was based
upon the provisions of the so-called "Right-to-Work Law"
which make the alleged conduct criminal, 27 and which give the
affected employee the right to recover actual and punitive

damages for such tort.28 The defendant demurred to the
complaint upon the grounds that the state court lacked juris22. M'Caskell v. Elliot, 5 Strob. 196 (S. C. 1850).
23, Hatchell v. Field, 238 S. C. 398, 120 S. E. 2d 401 (1961).
24. 238 S. C. 398 at 400, 120 S. E. 2d 401 at 402 (1961).
25. Id.
26. 239 S. C. 415, 123 S. E. 2d 524 (1962).
27. CODD oF LAWS Op SoUTH CAROLiNA § 40-46.2 and § 40-46.10 (1952
as amended).
28. CoDn op LAws oF SOUTH CAROLINA § 40-46.8 (1952), which also

allows the recovery of attorneys' fees as an element of damage.
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diction, relying upon the federal pre-emption doctrine, contending that the issues involved were exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Federal National Labor Relations Board.
The trial court sustained the demurrer, but the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Court of Common Pleas did have
jurisdiction of the controversy, basing its opinion upon the
principle that state jurisdiction over matters of industrial
relations have not been pre-empted where the consequences
29
of the conduct involved are "of compelling State interest,"
and finding that the payment of wages to employees is such
a matter of compelling State interest. To support the latter
point, the Court relied upon the State unemployment compensation statute" which contains a declaration of State
public policy and upon the 1938 statute making it a criminal
offense for an employer having the financial ability to wilfully and fraudulently fail or refuse to pay wages due an
employee after written demand therefor, 31 as well as upon
the provisions of the Right-to-Work Law.
The only point in the opinion that should perhaps be
criticized is very technical and pedantic: in its opinion the
Court twice mentioned the plaintiff's contention that their
cause of action for wrongful withholding of wages amounted
to "a common law tort action. '32 There seems to have been
no such cause of action in tort under the common law; the
only common law remedy for such wrong lay in contract.
The wrong was made tortious by the statute which authorized
the recovery of actual and punitive damages for violations of
the Right-to-Work Law, thereby treating it as a tort. Thus,
the wrong is a statutory tort, not a common law tort. Probably the Court meant by its statement to emphasize the point
that the conduct complained of is tortious under the State
law and is a situation in which State law has a traditional
and vital interest and provides a full and complete remedy.
Nuisance
33

Bowlin v. George, is an application of the law of nuisance
to a novel factual situation. The complaint alleged that the
29. 239 S. C. 415 at 420, 124 S. E. 2d 524 at 526 (1962).
30. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA . 46-36 (1952).
31. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 40-126 (1952).
32. 239 S. C. 415 at 419, 123 S. E. 2d 524 at 526, also at pages 421 and
S27, respectively.

33. 239 S. C. 429, 123 S. E. 2d 528 (1962).
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plaintiff's enjoyment of his property and his health and
welfare had been impaired and his property caused to depreciate in value by the defendant's maintenance of an automobile junk yard, wherein mosquitoes breed in the hundreds
of wrecked and decaying automobile hulks and parts. The
Supreme Court had no difficulty in holding that the complaint
stated a cause of action to recover damages for a private
nuisance, pointing out the distinctions between nuisances
per se and per accidens and between private and public nuisances.
Landlord's Duty to Business Guests
Three of this year's cases involve a landlord's duty to an
invitee, a business guest, injured on the premises.
In King v. J. C. Penney Co.34 the Court reversed a verdict
for a plaintiff who was allegedly injured on the defendant's
escalator when it jerked twice, throwing her down as she
reached for her little daughter. The Court once again rejected the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stating that to recover
damages, the plaintiff must prove by the greater weight or
preponderance of the evidence not only the injury but also
that it was caused by the defendant's actionable negligence.
The Court refused to apply to the owner of escalators the
high degree of care imposed upon common carriers, but applied the usual standard of ordinary and reasonable care,
which had previously been established as the standard of
care required in the operation of elevators. 5 The Court found
no actionable negligence on the defendant's part and entered
judgment in its favor.
The owner of a shopping center was held liable in Bruno
v. Pendleton Realty Co., Inc. 6 for failure to maintain the
sidewalk on its premises in a reasonably safe condition, resulting in injuries to a prospective customer of one of the
shopping center's stores. In this apparently first case in our
Supreme Court involving the liability of an owner of a shopping center who leases stores to various merchants and retains possession and control of the parking area and sidewalks, the Court imposed upon them the same standard of
care required of merchants generally, that is, they owe the
customer the duty of exercising ordinary care to keep those
34. 238 S. C.336, 120 S. E. 2d 229 (1961).
35. Medlock v. McAlister, 120 S. C. 65, 112 S. E. 436 (1922).
36. 240 S. C.46, 124 S. E. 2d 580 (1962).
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parts of the premises ordinarily used by the customers in
transacting business in a reasonably safe condition. The
plaintiff fell when stepping from a sidewalk to a walkway
of the same color concrete material but 4 or 5 inches lower
than the sidewalk. A heavy growth of grass which had existed for over a month overlapped the sidewalk to such an
extent that its curb was concealed, thus creating a deceptive
situation in that the sidewalk and walkway appeared to be
on the same level. The Court affirmed the verdict for the
plaintiff, pointing out that to maintain a step-down or stepup on the premises does not in and of itself constitute
negligence but that it may, depending upon its situation
and appearance. The Court held that the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence were both
properly jury questions.
In Darterv. Greenville Community Hotel Corp.,3 the plaintiff, a sixty-five year old woman suffering with arthritis,
was severely scalded and burned in the Poinsett Hotel as
she sat in the bathtub and turned the hot water faucet on.
The court of appeals affirmed the findings of the federal
district Judge sitting without jury that the defendant was
not negligent and that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence. It is somewhat surprising that no South Carolina
case has defined the degree of care which an innkeeper owes
to his guests; the Federal Court had previously ruled 3s that
in absence of South Carolina authority, the usual standard
of reasonable care applies, rather than a higher degree of
care which would make the innkeeper an insurer of his guests'
safety. Another interesting point in the opinion is the Court's
reference to the rule that a person suffering from the effects
of a physical disability owes to himself a commensurately
greater degree of care.
Automobile Negligence Cases
The cases involving negligence in the operation of automobiles are difficult to discuss in any particular order. In some
Surveys of Torts they have been arranged according to legal
principles and in others according to factual situations. My
organization is a combination of the two methods and will
discuss first two cases in which contributory negligence was
37. 301 F. 2d 70 (4th Cir., 1962).
38. Bowling v. Lewis, 261 F. 2d 311, 69 A.L.R. 2d 1100 (4th Cir., 1958).
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held to bar recovery, then two cases on the doctrine of proximate cause and last two cases of intersection collisions.
Contributory Negligence Barring Recovery
The verdict awarding actual and punitive damages in
Brown v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.3 9 was reversed and
judgment entered for defendant. The plaintiff in his automobile was injured in a night collision with the defendant's
standing flatcar which blocked a Sumter Street and was so
dark that it blended with that of the street. Contrary to
the plaintiff's testimony that the flatcar was not loaded,
testimony for the defendant was that the flatcar was clearly
visible for several hundred feet for it was loaded with two
John Deere combines painted green with yellow wheels.
The Court held the plaintiff guilty of gross contributory negligence as a matter of law, for if conditions were such that
he could not see a dark object until within a few feet of it,
he should not have driven at a speed of 30 miles per hour,
and, on the other hand, if the night were clear and the street
light made the flatcar visible for 150 or 200 feet, the plaintiff
should have seen it in time to avoid the collision. The Court
found no deceptive situation here which has given rise to
liability in other similar cases. The opinion relies heavily on
the Jones case40 which was decided a month before the Brown
case and which is discussed in last year's Survey of Torts.
In a wrongful death action brought under the guest passenger statute by the decedent's administratrix against the
driver of the automobile, 41 the Supreme Court affirmed the
directed verdict in the defendant's favor, holding that although the defendant was guilty of recklessness, the decedent
was guilty of contributory recklessness barring the recovery.
As stated by the Court:
We think that the lower Court was correct in holding,
under the foregoing facts, that plaintiff's intestate was
guilty of contributory recklessness in voluntarily riding
in the automobile driven by the defendant, when he knew
that the defendant was so intoxicated as to incapacitate
42
him from driving in a reasonable and prudent manner.
39.
40.
41.
42.

238 S. C. 191, 119 S. E. 2d 729 (1961).
Jones v. Southern Ry. Co., 238 S. C. 27, 118 S. E. 2d 880 (1961).
Ardis v. Griffin, 239 S. C. 529, 123 S. E. 2d 876 (1962).
239 S. C. 529 at 532, 123 S. E. 2d 876 at 878 (1962).
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Proximate Cause
Matthews v. Porter4a was an application of the general
principles of negligence and proximate cause to the case of
two successive collisions, so as to hold the original tortfeasor liable for injuries sustained in the second collision.
The defendant's automobile was involved in a collision with
one Singetary, as a result of which the defendant's automobile blocked the eastbound lane of traffic. The plaintiff arrived upon the scene of the collision and offered a physician
her assistance in administering aid to the injured parties;
as the plaintiff was standing by the physician by the side
of the defendant's car, the automobile of one McKnight struck
another car, skidded sideways down the highway and crushed
the plaintiff between his car and the defendant's. On appeal
from a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the defendant
offered in reality two contentions: 1) the defendant was not
negligent in the first collision with Singletary; 2) even if
he was, such negligence was cut off or insulated by the intervening negligence of McKnight which solely and proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries, and which could not
have been foreseen by the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care and which was not a natural and probable consequence of his original negligence. On the first point, the
Court held that the jury could properly have found, under
the conflicting testimony, that the defendant drove to the
left of the road, causing the first collision with Singletary.
On the second point, the Court discussed the principles for
foreseeability and proximate cause and stated that: "to exculpate a negligent defendant, the intervening cause must
be one which breaks the sequence or casual connection between the defendant's negligence and the injury alleged. The
superseding act must so intervene as to exclude the negligence
of the defendant as one of the proximate causes of the injury."4 4 The Court then went into a discussion of the facts
relative to the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint that
the defendant was negligent in permitting his automobile to
block the highway to such an extent that other vehicles could
not pass and in failing to warn approaching vehicles that the
highway was so blocked and impassable. Clearly, the highway was blocked, and the evidence made a jury issue as to
43. 239 S. C. 620, 124 S. E. 2d 321 (1962).

44. 239 S. C. 620 at 628, 124 S. E. 2d 321 at 325 (1962).
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whether the requisite warning was give. The Court relied
upon authorities from other jurisdictions to the effect that
the mere lapse of time up to an hour between the first and
second collisions was not sufficient to insulate the defendant's
original negligence, and that the fact that a law enforcement
officer had arrived at the scene and had taken control is one
circumstance to be considered in determining whether the defendant was negligent in failing to give warning, but that
it could not be said as a matter of law to have cut off the
effect of the prior negligence, since the duty to give warning,
like other legal duties, cannot be shifted to another so as to
exonerate one from the consequences of its non-performance.
Therefore, the Court held that all of the issues presented were
jury questions and that the lower court properly denied the
defendant's various motions.
Perhaps this case does not go so far in extending the
principles of proximate cause as it may seem to go upon first
reading. An entirely different case would have been presented to the Court if the only negligence of the defendant
had been that of driving to the left side of the road which
caused the first collision. Had the defendant then done everything he could have reasonably done after the initial collision
to give warning that the highway was blocked, the result
may well have been different. In other words, the negligence of the defendant which persisted and which continued
throughout the whole situation was his failure to give warning. Absent that negligence, the intervening negligence of
McKnight might have been held as a matter of law to have
constituted a superseding cause, thus insulating the defen4lant's initial negligence in driving across the center line.
Another proximate cause case was presented to the Fourth
45
Circuit Court of Appeals in Burleson v. Catnada. The plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile which ran into the
rear of a tractor-trailer driven by McCrae, which was loaded
with lumber, broken down and stalled on the highway. Suit
for negligence was brought against McCrae for leaving the
truck in the highway in the path of vehicular traffic and
against the Canadas, operators of a lumber company, for
overloading the truck to such an extent that it became disabled on the road. Although judgment was rendered against
McCrae, the plaintiff appealed from the summary judgment
45. 297 F. 2d 588 (4th Cir., 1961).
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dismissing the Canadas as parties defendant. The Court held
that under the rule of the Locklear 46 and Ayers 47 cases, even
if the Canadas were negligent in overloading the truck, they
could not reasonably have foreseen that McCrae would abandon it without sufficient warning to passengers on the highway. The Court further stated that the Canadas were entitled to presume that McCrae would comply with the statute
prohibiting stopping on a highway when it is practicable to
stop the vehicle off the highway.
Intersection Collisions
In Jumper v. Goodwin,48 the plaintiff was passing the defendant's truck when its driver, attempting to turn into an
unmarked, unpaved county road leading into the highway,
suddenly and without warning turned left into the path of
the plaintiff's car. On appeal from the jury's verdict in the
plaintiff's favor, the defendant contended that as a matter
of law the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
or contributory willfulness so as to bar her recovery against
the defendant. This contention was based upon the plaintiff's clear violation of the statute49 which prohibits the driving of a vehicle to the left side of the roadway when approaching within 100 feet of or traversing any intersection.
The Court affirmed the verdict on two theories: 1) although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se in violating the statute, whether such was the proximate cause of
the collision is a jury question and the jury may well have
found that it was not a proximate cause of the injury, in view
of the other delicts on the defendant's part; 2) although the
plaintiff was guilty of negligence per se, it was only simple
negligence and the jury might properly have found that the
defendant's conduct amounted to recklessness or wilfulness.
The court referred to the fact that there was evidence of only
the one delict on the plaintiff's part, while there was evidence
of three delicts on the defendant's part, namely that the defendant turned his vehicle from a direct course and moved
left upon the roadway without taking any care or precau46. Locklear v. Southeastern Stages, Inc., 193 S. C. 309, 8 S. E. 2d 321
(1940).
47. Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S. C. 267, 37 S. E. 2d 757
(1946).
48. 239 S. C. 508, 123 S. E. 2d 857 (1962).
49. CoDe oF LAWS OF SouTiH CARoLmnA

§

46-388 (1952).
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tion whatsoever to see that such movement could be made with
reasonable safety, in violation of statute;60 that he failed
to give a signal indicating his intended left turn, in violation
of statute ;' and that he failed to keep a proper lookout for
approaching traffic.
The defendant argued that since the jury found only actual
damages, it therefore found only simple negligence on his
part and not recklessness or wilfulness. However, the Court
dismissed this argument on the grounds that the trial judge's
charge left the awarding of punitive damages to the jury's
discretion, to which the defendant did not object.
The defendant relied strongly upon Sewell v. Hyder52 in
which the plaintiff was held barred by contributory wrongdoing from recovery as a matter of law in a factually similar
case. However, the Court had no difficulty in distinguishing
the Sewell case on the grounds that the collision there took
place at a city street intersection whereas here the collision
took place on an open country road where a driver is not so
often reminded of the presence of intersections as he is on
city streets.
McClure v. Price13 arose from an intersection collision
seven miles North of Charleston.
The plaintiffs were in an Oldsmobile proceeding west on
Dorchester Avenue toward its intersection with U. S. Highway
No. 52-A, also known as Meeting Street Road. The traffic
signal device was not operating facing the Dorchester Road
traffic, but was operating as to the highway traffic. Mr.
McClure applied brakes and almost stopped at the intersection,
proceeded slowly and cautiously into the intersection and then
put on brakes in an attempt to avoid colliding with the defendant's tractor-trailer loaded with bananas which came
"roaring out of no place" around a curve to its right with the
green light in its favor. In the tremendous impact which
ensued, Mr. McClure was killed and Mrs. McClure was injured
seriously. Verdicts of $20,000.00 were returned in each of the
two cases.
The Court rejected the defendant's contention that Mr.
McClure was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law, and held that at most such was a jury issue. The Court
50. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 46-405 (1952).

51. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 46-407 (1952).

52. 229 S. C. 480,93 S. E. 2d 637 (1956).

53. 300 F. 2d 538 (4th Cir., 1962).
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further held that the District Court properly ruled that there
was no evidence of common enterprise so as to impute any
negligence of Mr. McClure to his wife, since there was no relationship of principal and agent existing between them.
Wrongful Deatk and Miscellaneous
Ellison v. Simmons54 holds that no cause of action for
damage to person or property lies against a decedents personal representative in his capacity as representative of the
statutory beneficiaries of the cause of action for wrongful
death. Hence, such cause of action cannot be asserted by way
of counterclaim in a wrongful death action; evidence that
such an action is pending in another suit against the personal
representative is inadmissible in the wrongful death action,
and it is no error for the trial judge to refuse to charge the
jury that the defendant could not interpose a counterclaim
in the wrongful death action.
Mann v. Bowman Transportation,Inc.,5 5 a wrongful death
action, raises two, interesting points of law, along with the
issues usual to negligence actions. The plaintiff's decedent
had been killed while a passenger in an automobile which
was struck from the rear at night by the defendant's truck
while stopped on the highway without functioning signal
lights just over the crest of a hill, waiting for an oncoming
car to pass so it could negotiate a left turn onto a country
road. On the routine negligence issues, the Court of Appeals
held that the trial judge did not err in withdrawing from
the jury's consideration the question of contributory negligence on the decedent's part, there being at the most only
slight evidence that the driver was under the influence of intoxicants or fatigued and no evidence that the decedent knew
of the driver's condition, there being no evidence that the
dead passenger knew that the rear signal lights on the automobile did not function, and there being no grounds for
a finding that the decedent, a passenger in the back seat,
saw or should have seen the lights of the truck approaching
from the rear.
On one of the interesting points, the federal court had occasion to construe the code sectional which prohibits stopping, standing or parking on the main-traveled part of a
54. 238 S. C. 364, 120 S. E. 2d 209 (1961).
55. 300 F. 2d 505 (4th Cir., 1962).
56. CODE OF LAws OF So=Tr

CAR0LiNA

§ 46-481 (1952).
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highway (except when a car is disabled) when it is practical
to stop on the shoulder of the highway. As part of its defense of sole negligence on the part of the driver of the automobile, the defendant contended that the statute applies
to the situation where a car is stopped on a highway temporarily, preparatory to executing a left turn. Our Supreme
Court has not yet ruled upon the statute's applicability to
such a factual situation. The trial judge interpreted the
statute to mean that a driver could lawfully stop in his traffic
lane of a highway long enough for the lane of oncoming traffic to clear to allow him to make a left turn. The appellate
court found this construction reasonable, since a driver preparing to make a left turn cannot practicably move completely off the highway to the right to wait for all traffic
to clear.
The other point involved the proper distribution of the
$55,000.00 award between the decedent's two parents, his
mother whom he was helping to support, and his father,
long divorced from the mother, who had very seldom seen
him. The defendant contended that the father's $27,500.00
portion of the award was excessive as a matter of law since
there was no evidence of damage or loss on the father's part.
There is an ambiguity in the section of our wrongful death
statute5 7 relating to the distribution of damages: one portion
provides in effect that the jury may determine damages proportionate to the injury sustained by the beneficiaries respeetively; the next sentence states that the recovery sha/l
be divided according to the Statute of Descent and Distribution. The Court held, in effect, that if the latter mandatory
division prevails, then the father and mother obviously must
share equally in the recovery, and if the former discretionary
division prevails, the result in the lower court was correct because the defendant neither requested that an appropriate
jury instruction be given nor objected to the failure to give
it. The Court refused to say that, as a matter of law, the
father experienced no grief, no sorrow, no wounded feelings,
no mental shock and suffering, or that he would not lose
future companionship as a result of his son's death.
In Gaskins v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.58 the plaintiff
was seriously injured in a collision between his automobile
57. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §

58. 299 F. 2d 236 (4th Cir., 1962).
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and the defendant's tractor trailer. The evidence conflicted
as to the truck's position in the road, but the federal judge
sitting without jury found that it was on the wrong side of
the road. The plaintiff's car admittedly skidded, and the defendant contended that such skidding was the cause of its
Vehicle's improper position, the plaintiff contending that his
automobile stayed in its proper lane. The Court of Appeals in
a crisply worded opinion held that the conflicts of evidence
were properly resolved in the plaintiff's favor, that the sudden
emergency doctrine was of no avail to the defendant, and
that the plaintiff's skidding in and of itself did not prove
contributory negligence in absence of proof of antecedent
negligence responsible for the skidding.
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